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Low-Skilled Immigrants and the U.S. Labor Market
* 
 
Over the last several decades, two of the most significant developments in the U.S. labor 
market have been: (1) rising inequality, and (2) growth in both the size and the diversity of 
immigration flows. Because a large share of new immigrants arrive with very low levels of 
schooling, English proficiency, and other skills that have become increasingly important 
determinants of success in the U.S. labor market, an obvious concern is that such immigrants 
are a poor fit for the restructured American economy. In this chapter, we evaluate this 
concern by discussing evidence for the United States on three relevant topics: the labor 
market integration of immigrants, the socioeconomic attainment of the U.S.-born 
descendants of immigrants, and the impact of immigration on the wages and employment 
opportunities of native workers. We show that low-skilled immigrants have little trouble finding 
paid employment and that the wages they earn are commensurate with their skills. Overall, 
the U.S.-born second generation has achieved economic parity with mainstream society; for 
some Hispanic groups, however, this is not the case. Finally, we survey the pertinent 
academic literature and conclude that, on the whole, immigration to the United States has not 
had large adverse consequences for the labor market opportunities of native workers. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J61, J62, J68 
  





Stephen J. Trejo 
Department of Economics 
University of Texas at Austin 
1 University Station C3100 
Austin, TX  78712-0301 
United States 
E-mail: trejo@austin.utexas.edu  
 
                                                 
* This research was supported by NICHD grants R03HD050574 and R03HD066104 to Stephen Trejo 
and R24HD042849 to the Population Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. The 
content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views 
of the NICHD or the NIH.  
I.  Introduction 
  Over the last several decades, two of the most significant developments in the U.S. labor 
market have been:  (1) rising inequality, and (2) growth in both the size and the diversity of 
immigration flows.  Because a large share of new immigrants arrive with very low levels of 
schooling, English proficiency, and other skills that have become increasingly important 
determinants of success in the U.S. labor market, an obvious concern is that such immigrants are 
a poor fit for the restructured American economy.  In this chapter, we evaluate this concern by 
discussing evidence for the United States on three relevant topics:  the labor market integration 
of immigrants, the socioeconomic attainment of the U.S.-born descendants of immigrants, and 
the impact of immigration on the wages and employment opportunities of native workers. 
  The backdrop for resurgent U.S. immigration has been an economy in which earnings 
inequality and the labor market rewards to education and other indicators of worker skill have 
increased dramatically (Levy and Murnane 1992; Autor and Katz 1999).  How have U.S. 
immigrants fared in the last few turbulent decades?  In particular, how have recent shifts in the 
wage structure and other ongoing changes in the U.S. economy affected the large group of 
immigrants who arrive with little in the way of schooling or skills?  In effect, these unskilled 
immigrants are swimming upstream against the predominant economic currents that have 
heightened the importance of education and cognitive ability.  In the restructured U.S. labor 
market, what is the role of immigrants, in general, and of unskilled immigrants, in particular? 
  As noted by Raphael and Smolensky (2009b), rising immigration—particularly unskilled 
immigration—could potentially exacerbate U.S. poverty through two main channels.  Because 
poverty rates are relatively high for immigrants (Chapman and Bernstein 2003; Sullivan and 
Zeigert 2008; Raphael and Smolensky 2009b), especially for recent arrivals and for less-skilled   2
immigrants, an increased share of the population that is foreign-born has a direct or 
compositional effect that raises the overall U.S. poverty rate.  In addition, to the extent that labor 
market competition with immigrants lowers the wages and employment rates of U.S.-born 
workers, immigration could have the indirect effect of raising poverty among U.S. natives.  The 
evidence we review below sheds light on both the direct and indirect pathways through which 
immigration might affect poverty. 
  The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss how immigrants 
perform in the U.S. labor market, with an emphasis on the fundamental role played by human 
capital.  The following section presents a similar analysis for the U.S.-born descendants of 
immigrants, highlighting the diversity of immigrant backgrounds and the problems this can 
create for tracking the intergenerational progress of immigrant groups.  The section after that 
provides a brief survey of the academic literature assessing the impact of U.S. immigration on 
the wages and employment opportunities of native workers, and a final section summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
II.  Labor Market Integration of Immigrants 
  How quickly and completely do immigrants adapt to the U.S. labor market?  In this 
section, we discuss several key aspects of immigrant economic integration:  the skills and human 
capital that immigrants bring to the labor market, the availability of jobs for immigrant workers, 
and the extent to which the earnings of these workers reflect their skills.  Given the policy 
concerns that have been raised regarding low-skill immigrants, we focus particular attention on 
this group, and we also highlight importance differences by race/ethnicity. 
  To illustrate patterns of immigrant human capital and labor market outcomes, we pool   3
microdata from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
For each of these years, the ACS data constitute a one percent sample of the U.S. population.  
Our analysis sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions.  We exclude 
women in order to minimize biases arising from selective labor force participation, and we 
choose this age range so as to focus on men in their prime working years who likely have 
completed their formal schooling. 
  We distinguish individuals born in the United States (i.e., natives) from those born in 
another country.
1  Within the foreign-born population, those born abroad of an American parent 
are treated as a separate nativity category, and remaining foreign-born individuals are split into 
“child immigrants” who arrived in the United States before the age of 16 and “adult immigrants” 
who arrived at age 16 or later.  We make this latter distinction because immigrants who arrive as 
children, and who therefore acquire much of their education and all of their work experience in 
the United States and who are more likely to speak English fluently, experience greater 
economic success than immigrants who come as adults (Rumbaut 2004; Bleakley and Chin 
2004). 
  Using answers to the questions regarding Hispanic origin and race, we assign each 
individual to one of five mutually exclusive and exhaustive racial/ethnic groups:  Hispanic (of 
any race), and non-Hispanic white, black, Asian (including Native Hawaiian and Pacific 
Islander), and a residual “other race” category.  Starting in 2000, the Census and ACS permit 
respondents to designate more than one race (Grieco and Cassidy 2001; del Pinal 2004).  The 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, we use the term “immigrant” as synonymous with foreign-born individuals, in contrast to 
the official terminology used by the U.S. government in which immigrants are legal permanent residents, and other foreigners 
such as tourists, business travelers, and recent refugee arrivals are “nonimmigrant aliens.”  The data analyzed here cannot make 
such distinctions among foreign-born individuals.  Included within our “immigrant” sample are individuals born in Puerto Rico 
and other outlying areas of the United States.  Although persons born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens and enjoy unfettered   4
Hispanic origin question, however, still requires a single response.  Our “other race” category 
includes any non-Hispanics who designated two or more major race groups, as well as those who 
identified with an “American Indian or Alaskan Native” group.  Therefore, the non-Hispanic 
categories “white,” “black,” and “Asian” represent individuals who designated a single major 
race group.
2
  Table 1 reports the distribution of our sample by nativity and race/ethnicity and shows 
sample sizes and average completed years of schooling for the relevant groups.
3  About 80 recent 
of these men were born in the United States, one percent were born abroad of an American 
parent, and the remaining 19 percent of the sample is made up of immigrants, most of whom 
were at least age 16 when they arrived in the United States (15 percent of the total sample), but 
some arrived at a younger age (4 percent of the total sample).  The ACS data provide large 
samples of all nativity groups, and sizeable samples remain even for particular racial/ethnic 
categories within nativity groups (see panel B of Table 1).  In terms of race and ethnicity, 
immigrants are much more diverse than U.S. natives.  Whereas 80 percent of the U.S.-born 
population is comprised of non-Hispanic whites, more than half of immigrants are Hispanic and 
another fifth are Asian. 
  Table 1 suggests important links between nativity, race/ethnicity, and skills.  Overall, 
average years of education are lowest for adult immigrants (11.8 years) and highest for persons 
                                                                                                                                                             
mobility between the island and the U.S. mainland, such migrants encounter many of the same adjustment issues as other 
immigrants. 
2 In the 2000 Census, less than two percent of non-Hispanics designated more than one major race group (Jones and 
Symens Smith 2001).  Consequently, our decision to include only those who report a single race in the white, black, and Asian 
race groups is unlikely to have much effect on the results. 
3 Beginning in 1990, the Census questions about educational attainment were changed to ask specifically about 
postsecondary degrees obtained rather than years of schooling, and the ACS education questions are modeled on those in the 
2000 Census.  We follow Jaeger’s (1997) recommendations for how to construct a completed years of schooling variable from 
the revised education questions.   5
either born in the United States (13.5 years) or born abroad of an American parent (13.9 years).  
Immigrants who arrived as children and potentially received some or all of their schooling in the 
United States possess an intermediate level of educational attainment (12.6 years).  Within every 
nativity group, Hispanics have the lowest average schooling level (ranging from 9.7 years for 
Hispanic adult immigrants to 11.2 years for Hispanic child immigrants to 12.6 years for U.S.-
born Hispanics), so the educational deficit of immigrants in part reflects the heavy concentration 
of Hispanics in the foreign-born population.  In contrast, non-Hispanic whites and Asians exhibit 
relatively high schooling levels within every nativity group. 
  In order to provide further detail on the substantial education differences that exist 
between nativity and racial/ethnic groups, Table 2 shows percentage distributions across four 
schooling levels.  The lowest education category, which we will sometimes refer to as high 
school “dropouts,” consists of those who have completed fewer than 12 years of schooling.  The 
next category, those with exactly 12 years of schooling, is dominated by high school graduates, 
but it also includes persons who completed twelfth grade but did not receive a diploma, as well 
as persons who completed high school by means of an equivalency exam such as the General 
Equivalency Diploma (GED).  The education category for 13-15 years of schooling includes 
those with some college but not a bachelor’s degree, and the highest education category 
represents those with at least a bachelor’s degree. 
  Table 2 highlights the low educational attainment of many foreign-born men.
4  Thirty 
percent of adult immigrants and 20 percent of child immigrants have less than 12 years of 
schooling, compared to only 8 percent of U.S.-born men and 6 percent of those born abroad of 
an American parent.  Though not shown in Table 2, the contrast is even more striking for men 
                                                 
4 Although Table 2 presents information only for men, the education distributions of women are similar.   6
with less than 9 years of schooling:  this group represents 21 percent of adult immigrants versus 
just 2 percent of U.S.-born men.  Looking at this same phenomenon from a slightly different 
perspective, adult immigrants comprise only 15 percent of the overall sample of men in Table 2, 
but they make up 38 percent of the men with less than 12 years of schooling and 62 percent of 
the men with less than 9 years of schooling.  Similarly, immigrants who arrived as children 
represent just 4 percent of the overall sample but 7 percent of those with less than 12 years of 
schooling and 8 percent of those with less than 9 years of schooling.  Clearly, immigrants are 
disproportionately concentrated among U.S. workers with the lowest education levels. 
  At the same time, however, immigrants are well represented among U.S. workers with 
the highest education levels.  For example, completion of a bachelor’s degree is about equally 
common for adult immigrants (28 percent) as for U.S.-born men (29 percent), whereas a higher 
fraction of adult immigrants than U.S.-born men earn postgraduate degrees (13 percent versus 10 
percent, though this education category is not separately identified in Table 2).  Immigrants are 
overrepresented at the bottom and, to a lesser extent, the top of the U.S. educational distribution, 
and they are underrepresented in the middle (with 42 percent of adult immigrants and 54 percent 
of child immigrants, compared to 63 percent of U.S.-born men, completing 12-15 years of 
schooling). 
  Table 2 also documents the extensive variation in educational attainment by 
race/ethnicity within nativity groups.  Among Hispanic adult immigrants, for example, almost 
half of these men possess less than 12 years of schooling and only 9 percent have completed a 
bachelor’s degree.  The educational distribution is reversed, however, among Asian adult 
immigrants, with just 9 percent being high school dropouts and 57 percent having graduated 
from college.  The educational distribution of white immigrants is similar to that of Asian   7
immigrants, whereas the distribution of black immigrants has more weight in the middle 
categories representing high school graduates and those with some college.  The patterns of 
racial/ethnic differences in schooling for other nativity groups (i.e., child immigrants, those born 
abroad of an American parent, and U.S.-born men) are broadly similar to those for adult 
immigrant men, although the magnitudes of the differences are usually smaller, especially 
between Hispanics and non-Hispanics.  Among U.S.-born men, however, the schooling 
advantage of Asians is even more remarkable; their college completion rate of 54 percent far 
exceeds the corresponding rates of 32 percent for Anglos, 20 percent for “other race” 
individuals, and 16 percent for Hispanic Americans and for African Americans. 
A.  Employment 
  How well has the U.S. labor market been able to absorb the large inflows of immigrants 
received in recent years, especially the immigrants from less developed countries who often 
arrive with little education and few skills?  An important indicator of the answer to this question 
is the ease with which these immigrants find gainful employment in the United States.  
Therefore, we next compare the employment rates of foreign-born and U.S.-born men, focusing 
in particular on how these comparisons vary by education and by the amount of time immigrants 
have had to adjust to their new country of residence. 
  For the sample of men described above, Table 3 reports employment rates by nativity and 
education category.  Here, the employment rate represents the percentage of men who were 
employed at any time during the twelve months preceding the survey date.  Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses.  Aggregating individuals from all education levels (i.e., see the far right 
column of Table 3), the overall male employment rates are similar across nativity groups, 
ranging from 90 percent for U.S.-born men to 92 percent for child immigrants to 93 percent for   8
adult immigrants and for those born abroad of an American parent.  Immigrant-native 
employment differences vary enormously by education level, however.  Among high school 
dropouts, the employment rate of adult immigrants exceeds that of U.S.-born men by over 20 
percentage points, whereas the corresponding employment advantage of adult immigrants falls to 
5 percentage points among those with 12 years of schooling and disappears at higher education 
levels.  This pattern arises because employment rates increase strongly with education for U.S.-
born men but not for adult immigrants.  For other foreign-born men—child immigrants and those 
born abroad of an American parent—the relationship between employment and schooling is 
positive but not as strong as for U.S.-born men.  As a result, sizeable employment advantages 
(relative to U.S.-born men) also emerge in the lowest education category for these other foreign-
born men (17 percentage points for child immigrants and 10 percentage points for those born 
abroad of an American parent). 
  An important lesson from Table 3 is that foreign-born men display high employment 
propensities, relative to U.S.-born men, among those with the lowest schooling levels (high 
school dropouts), and the magnitude of this immigrant employment advantage is striking.  At 
other levels of schooling, foreign-born and U.S.-born men exhibit similar rates of employment.  
Are these patterns the spurious result of differences in the characteristics of foreign-born and 
U.S.-born men that are correlated with employment?  To shed light on this issue, we use 
regression analysis to investigate the influence of observable factors on immigrant-native 
employment differences. 
  Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from least squares regressions in which the 
dependent variable is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed at any time during   9
the twelve months preceding the survey date.
5  Given our special interest in low-skill 
immigrants, and also to examine in greater detail the intriguing educational pattern observed in 
Table 3, we split the sample into two education groups—men with less than 12 years of 
schooling and those with at least 12 years—and we run separate regressions for each group.  All 
regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey year.
6  The regressions for 
men with 12 or more years of schooling also include dummies identifying individuals with 13-15 
and 16 or more years of schooling (with individuals possessing exactly 12 years of schooling 
serving as the reference educational group in these regressions). 
  The columns labeled (1) in Table 4 show the residual employment differentials between 
each group of foreign born men and U.S.-born men (the reference group), after conditioning on 
the control variables.  The control variables produce only minor changes in the estimated 
immigrant-native employment differentials, so the column (1) coefficients confirm the patterns 
observed in the raw employment rates in Table 3.  Among high school dropouts, the regression-
adjusted employment advantage of foreign-born relative to U.S.-born men is 19 percentage 
points for adult immigrants, 13 percentage points for child immigrants, and 8 percentage points 
for those born abroad of an American parent.  These differentials are just slightly smaller than 
the raw differentials from Table 3.  Among those with at least 12 years of schooling, however, 
the column (1) coefficients indicate virtually no difference in the adjusted employment rates of 
U.S.-born men and any group of foreign-born men. 
                                                 
5 Although the dependent variable in these regressions is a dichotomous indicator of employment status, we choose to 
report least squares estimates (i.e., linear probability models) because the coefficients are easier to interpret.  Probit estimates, 
however, imply similar marginal effects.  In order to account for the heteroskedasticity that arises with linear probability models 
(or for other reasons), we report robust standard errors (White 1980) in parentheses for all regressions. 
6 The controls for age are dummy variables identifying five-year age intervals (i.e., 30-34, 35-39, …, 55-59, with 25-29 
serving as the omitted reference group).  The controls for geographic location are dummy variables identifying the nine Census 
divisions (with the Pacific region serving as the omitted reference group) and whether the respondent lives outside of a   10
  The columns labeled (2) in Table 4 distinguish adult immigrants by how long they have 
lived in the United States.  The estimates reveal a sharp jump in the employment rate of adult 
immigrants after their first couple of years in the United States, and thereafter employment 
seems to change little with further time in the country.
7  This initial jump in employment, 
gleaned by comparing adult immigrants in their first two years after arrival with those who have 
been in the United States for three to five years, is smaller for high school dropouts (3.5 
percentage points) than for immigrants with at least 12 years of schooling (7.5 percentage 
points).  Nonetheless, if we disregard the very recent arrivals and instead focus on the 
employment rates of adult immigrants who have been here long enough to be past the initial 
period of adjustment to the U.S. labor market, then we see the same pattern of results as before.  
In the lowest education group—those with less than 12 years of schooling—adult immigrants 
hold an employment advantage of almost 20 percentage points over U.S.-born men.  Among men 
with higher levels of schooling, employment rates do not differ much by nativity, once we focus 
on adult immigrants who have had some time to adjust to their new surroundings. 
  Hispanics and blacks represent disproportionate shares of U.S.-born men with less than 
12 years of schooling.  For a variety of reasons, employment rates are particularly low for black 
men (Welch 1990, Juhn 1992), which raises the concern that the employment comparison 
between low-skill immigrants and natives is distorted by the unique circumstances of blacks and 
other disadvantaged minority groups in the native population.  To explore this issue, Table 5 
                                                                                                                                                             
metropolitan area.  The controls for ACS survey year are dummy variables identifying 2006 and 2007 (with 2005 serving as the 
omitted reference year). 
7 Because they come from a very narrow time period (2005-2007), the data analyzed here are incapable of 
distinguishing assimilation and cohort effects (Borjas 1985, 1995a), but other studies that follow immigrant arrival cohorts across 
Censuses show that the depressed labor force activity of recent arrivals primarily represents an adjustment process that all 
immigrant cohorts experience during their first few years in the United States.  See, for example, Chiswick, Cohen, and Zach 
(1997), Funkhouser and Trejo (1998), Schoeni (1998), Funkhouser (2000), and Antecol, Kuhn and Trejo (2006).   11
reports coefficients from regressions identical to the column (1) specification in Table 4, except 
that we now distinguish by race/ethnicity within each nativity group.  The reference group for 
the resulting comparisons is U.S.-born, non-Hispanic whites, and the reported coefficients 
represent employment differentials (conditional on the control variables) between men of each 
nativity/ethnicity group and this reference group.  To focus on the most important groups, Table 
5 reports only the coefficients for U.S.-born men and for adult immigrants. 
  In terms of immigrant-native comparisons, the same qualitative patterns emerge as 
before.  Even when compared to U.S.-born, non-Hispanic whites, adult immigrants from every 
racial/ethnic group display large employment advantages when the sample is restricted to men in 
the lowest education category.  These employment differentials range from 11-13 percent for 
Asian, white, and black immigrants to 16-17 percent for “other race” and Hispanic immigrants.  
Also as before, the corresponding differentials remain small among men with at least 12 years of 
schooling, ranging from an employment disadvantage of 3 percent for Asian immigrants to an 
employment advantage of 2 percent for Hispanic immigrants.  In addition, Table 5 highlights 
significant racial/ethnic disparities in employment among U.S.-born men.  Looking at native 
high school dropouts, for example, the employment rate is 15 percentage points lower for 
African-American than for white men.  The analogous comparison for non-dropouts produces a 
smaller but still sizeable employment deficit of 8 percentage points for African-American men.  
U.S.-born men in the “other race” category also exhibit relatively low employment rates. 
  On the whole, this analysis suggests that finding paid employment is not a major problem 
for U.S. immigrants.  After a period of adjustment during the first few years upon arrival, the 
overall employment rate of immigrant men quickly approaches and ultimately slightly exceeds 
that of U.S.-born men.  Among those with the lowest education levels, immigrants exhibit   12
substantially higher rates of employment than comparable natives, and this is true for immigrants 
from every major racial/ethnic group, even in comparison to U.S.-born, non-Hispanic whites.
8  
Despite ongoing structural changes in the U.S. labor market—including the widening of the 
earnings distribution and the steep rise in the reward associated with additional years of formal 
schooling—employer demand for low-skill immigrant workers has remained high.  Reinforcing 
this conclusion are the high employment propensities of Hispanic immigrants (see Table 5), a 
group with very low levels of schooling (see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
B.  Wages 
  Perhaps the ultimate indicator of labor market success is wages (i.e., average hourly 
earnings), since wages reflect the market’s valuation of a worker’s entire package of abilities and 
attributes, including those for which data are often lacking (e.g., family background, or the 
quality of schooling).  For this reason, it is informative to compare the wages of foreign-born and 
U.S.-born workers, both with and without controls for observable human capital.  Before doing 
so, however, we need to introduce English language proficiency as an important dimension of 
human capital that is closely related to nativity and wages. 
  The ACS data provide self-reported information on English ability, and we display some 
of this information in Table 6.  All respondents were asked whether they “speak a language other 
than English at home,” and only those who answered affirmatively were asked how well they 
speak English, with possible responses of “very well,” “well,” “not well,” or “not at all.”  The 
top panel of Table 6 shows, separately for each nativity group, the percentage distribution of 
                                                 
8 In other work (Duncan and Trejo 2009b), we explore in greater detail the immigrant employment advantage among 
low-skill men, and we argue that this finding is consistent with the migrant selectivity that arises naturally in a model where 
potential migrants jointly choose location and labor force participation.   13
men across the following three-way categorization of English proficiency:  those who speak no 
other language besides English, those who speak another language and report speaking English 
“very well” or “well,” and those who speak another language and report speaking English “not 
well” or “not at all.”  Perhaps not surprisingly, over a third of adult immigrants fall into the 
lowest category of English ability, whereas only 11 percent of child immigrants and 3 percent of 
those born abroad of an American parent report this same level of deficiency in English.  Within 
each nativity group, the bottom panel of Table 6 further distinguishes high school dropouts from 
those with at least 12 years of schooling.  There is a strong relationship between education and 
English ability among foreign-born men, with the proportion of dropouts reporting the lowest 
category of English proficiency reaching 65 percent for adult immigrants, 36 percent for child 
immigrants, and 20 percent for those born abroad of an American parent. 
  Table 7 presents wage regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of average hourly earnings during the twelve months preceding the survey date.  The 
sample is now limited to employed men, and observations with average hourly earnings below 
$1 or above $1,000 are excluded as outliers.  The regression specifications are identical to those 
used for the employment regressions in Table 4, except that the columns labeled (3) add controls 
for English proficiency.  The column (1) estimates reveal that, on average, adult immigrants earn 
about 20 percent less than U.S.-born men, and that this wage gap is similar among high school 
dropouts as among those with at least 12 years of schooling.  The corresponding wage deficit is 
much smaller for immigrants who arrived as children:  7 percent among high school dropouts 
and 3 percent among those with at least 12 years of schooling. 
  In the column (2) specification, adult immigrants are distinguished by how long they 
have been in the United States.  During their first two years after arrival, adult immigrants   14
display a wage gap relative to U.S.-born men of over 30 percent, but this gap narrows for 
immigrants with longer durations of U.S. residence.  For adult immigrants who have lived in the 
United States for more than 20 years, the wage deficit falls to 8 percent among high school 
dropouts and 13 percent among those with at least 12 years of schooling.  Following Chiswick 
(1978), economists have analyzed how immigrant wages vary with duration of U.S. residence in 
order to gauge labor market assimilation.  In his influential study, Chiswick analyzed data from 
the 1970 Census and concluded that the earnings of immigrants grow rapidly as they adjust to 
the U.S. labor market and acquire U.S.-specific human capital (including proficiency in the 
English language).  Chiswick’s analysis suggests that the immigrants in his data erased their 
initial earnings deficit relative to natives within ten or fifteen years after arrival and went on to 
outearn natives in the later stages of their careers. 
  As noted by Borjas (1985, 1995a), however, cross-sectional analyses of earnings (such as 
Chiswick’s study or the column (2) regressions reported in Table 7) can give a misleading view 
of immigrant assimilation, because such analyses confound the effects of duration of U.S. 
residence and arrival cohort (i.e., at any given point in time, variation across immigrants in years 
of U.S. residence arises only from differences in year of entry to the United States).  In 
particular, over the last half of the twentieth century, dramatic changes occurred in the national 
origin and skill composition of U.S. immigrant flows.  The share of immigrants originating in 
Europe and Canada fell sharply, with the slack taken up by surging immigration from Asia and 
Latin America.  A substantial body of research shows that more recent immigrant arrival cohorts 
are less skilled and have been less successful in the labor market than earlier cohorts, and that 
there are important links between the shifts in national origins and declining immigrant skills   15
(Borjas 1992, 1994a, 1999; Card 2005).
9  Contrary to the traditional view that immigrants 
rapidly assimilate into the economic mainstream of American society, the revisionist studies 
predict that most foreign-born workers who entered the United States in recent years will 
throughout their lifetimes earn substantially less than native workers (Borjas 1995a). 
  To date, Lubotsky (2007) provides the most convincing estimates of post-migration 
earnings growth for foreign-born workers in the United States.  By employing longitudinal data 
from the social security earnings histories of individual workers, Lubotsky’s analysis not only 
addresses unobserved heterogeneity across immigrant arrival cohorts, but it also accounts for 
selective emigration.  Though correcting for these factors lowers estimates of immigrant earnings 
growth, Lubotsky still finds evidence of substantial earnings assimilation for foreign-born 
workers in the United States:  “over their first 20 years in the United States, immigrant earnings 
grow by 10-15 percent relative to the earnings of native-born workers” (Lubotsky 2007, p. 864).  
Consistent with other research (Borjas 1995a; Trejo 2003; Blau and Kahn 2007; Borjas and Katz 
2007), Lubotsky also finds that earnings assimilation is considerably slower for Hispanic 
(predominately Mexican) immigrants than for other immigrants. 
  The wage regressions reported in the columns labeled (3) in Table 7 add dummy 
variables indicating self-reported English proficiency, with the reference group consisting of 
those who speak no other language besides English.  Consistent with other studies (McManus, 
Gould, and Welch 1983; Chiswick and Miller 1995; Bleakley and Chin 2004), these estimates 
imply large economic returns to English proficiency.
10  For example, among high school 
                                                 
9 In particular, immigrant earnings in the United States are strongly correlated with per capita Gross National Product 
in the source country (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; Borjas 1987), presumably because workers from industrialized countries are 
better trained than workers from developing countries and their skills transfer more readily to the U.S. labor market. 
10 Under a human capital interpretation, the coefficients on the English proficiency dummies measure the increase in 
productivity that accompanies learning to communicate in the dominant language, but other factors may contribute to the 
observed correlation between wages and ability to speak English.  For example, the English proficiency coefficients may capture   16
dropouts who speak a language other than English, those who speak English “very well” earn 16 
percent more than those who speak English “not well” and 27 percent more than those who 
speak English “not at all.”  The corresponding payoffs to English ability are even higher among 
those with at least 12 years of schooling.  Moreover, the dramatic reduction in the residual wage 
deficits of foreign-born workers as we move from column (2) to column (3) indicates that the 
lower English skills of immigrants account for most of their earnings disadvantage relative to 
comparable U.S.-born workers.  The estimates in column (3) suggest that wage differences are 
small between foreign-born and U.S.-born workers who possess similar levels of human capital 
(i.e., education and English proficiency).  For example, wage deficits (relative to natives) are no 
more than five percent for adult immigrants who have had at least six years to adjust to life in the 
United States, and immigrants who arrived as children actually enjoy a slight wage advantage.  
Overall, the earnings of U.S. immigrants seem to be commensurate with the skills they bring to 
the labor market. 
  Table 8 presents selected coefficients from wage regressions that distinguish by 
race/ethnicity within each nativity group.  Otherwise, the column (1) specification in Table 8 is 
identical to the column (1) specification in Table 7.  The column (2) specification in Table 8 
adds controls for English proficiency.  The reported coefficients represent regression-adjusted 
wage differentials between men of each nativity/ethnicity group and U.S.-born, non-Hispanic 
                                                                                                                                                             
labor market discrimination against workers with foreign accents (Davila, Bohara, and Saenz 1993), or they may reflect 
unobserved factors such as cognitive ability, motivation, family background, or school quality.  Bleakley and Chin (2004, 2010) 
have developed the most compelling approach to date for identifying the causal effects of English proficiency on immigrant 
earnings and other outcomes.  This approach exploits the fact that younger children learn languages more easily than do older 
children and adults, and therefore immigrant children from non-English-speaking countries who arrive in the United States 
before age ten or so learn English more quickly and completely than do comparable children who immigrate at slightly older 
ages.  The nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between age-at-arrival and English proficiency explains why a similar 
pattern of age-at-arrival effects emerges for immigrant outcomes that depend on English proficiency.  Instrumental variables 
estimates based on these associations imply earnings returns to English proficiency even larger than the corresponding least 
squares estimates, as the upward bias to least squares estimates produced by unobserved ability and other factors is overwhelmed   17
whites (the reference group).  Among U.S.-born workers, black men earn on average about 20 
percent less than white men with the same level of education, whereas the corresponding wage 
gaps are substantially smaller for native men from other racial/ethnic groups, with this gap 
essentially disappearing for U.S.-born Asians.  For adult immigrants from all racial/ethnic 
groups, English language deficiencies account for sizeable portions of their wage deficits relative 
to U.S.-born whites.  Indeed, after conditioning on English proficiency, immigrant high school 
dropouts from all groups except Asians earn as much or more as native dropouts from the same 
racial/ethnic group (e.g., among dropouts, the column (2) specification shows Hispanic 
immigrants earning 12 percent less than U.S.-born whites, whereas the analogous wage deficit is 
slightly larger for U.S.-born Hispanics).  Among those with at least 12 years of schooling, 
however, wages are significantly higher for U.S.-born compared to foreign-born Hispanics and 
blacks (as well as Asians), even after controlling for English proficiency.  Nevertheless, once we 
condition on observable skills, the largest remaining wage deficits in Table 8 tend to be 
associated with race (black and, to a lesser extent, “other race”) rather than with nativity. 
 
C.  Illegal Immigration 
  A key feature of U.S. immigration is that much of it is undocumented.  The clandestine 
nature of illegal immigration makes this population difficult to observe, but some credible 
information is available nonetheless.  Passel (2007) estimates that undocumented immigrants 
represent almost a third of the total foreign-born population living in the United States as of 
March 2006, and the undocumented share is much higher among recent arrivals who have been 
in the country for ten years or less.  Passel also shows that undocumented immigrants are 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the more severe downward bias generated by measurement error in the data describing English language skills.  Therefore,   18
overwhelmingly Hispanic, with 57 percent originating in Mexico and another 26 percent coming 
from elsewhere in Latin America.  Indeed, Passel (2004) reports that over 80 percent of all 
Mexican immigrants who arrived in the United States after 1990 were undocumented as of 
March 2002. 
  How does legal status, by itself, affect the labor market opportunities of immigrants?  
Most data sources cannot identify illegal immigrants, and so they are unable to answer this 
question.  A few studies, however, have been able to shed light on the issue by exploiting unique 
surveys that contain information about legal status.  Chiswick (1988), for example, analyzes 
samples of illegal immigrants who had been apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (as it was called back then), and he shows that their U.S. earnings are systematically 
related, in expected ways, to variables that proxy for labor market skills (i.e., education, work 
experience, seniority with the current employer, and duration of U.S. residence).  Massey (1987) 
compares the U.S. wages earned by legal and illegal immigrants originating in four Mexican 
communities.  He reports that undocumented Mexican immigrants earn substantially less, on 
average, than do legal Mexican immigrants, but he also shows that this wage gap is explained by 
the lower human capital possessed by undocumented immigrants, particularly with regard to 
English proficiency and U.S. work experience.  After controlling for observable determinants of 
earnings, Massey finds that legal status per se has little direct effect on U.S. wages for the 
Mexican immigrants in his sample.  Donato and Massey (1993), however, obtain a different 
result when they conduct a similar analysis of later and more extensive data from 13 Mexican 
communities.  In these later data, undocumented status reduces wages by about 20 percent, even 
after controlling for observables. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the least squares estimates of the returns to English proficiency reported in Table 7 probably understate the true returns.   19
  Perhaps the best evidence on the labor market impact of legal status comes from a survey 
that tracked the experiences of initially-undocumented immigrants before and after they were 
granted permanent legal resident status through the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  Despite using somewhat different approaches to analyzing 
these data, Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) reach similar conclusions.  
First, holding observable skills constant, estimates suggest that legalization raised the wages of 
these workers by about 5-10 percent relative to what their wages would have been had the 
workers remained undocumented.  Second, by increasing the incentives for these workers to 
invest in human capital, legalization also may have induced greater skill acquisition and thereby 
boosted wages through this indirect channel. 
  Although data limitations preclude strong conclusions on this topic, available research 
suggests that labor market skills play a much bigger role than legal status in determining 
economic outcomes for U.S. immigrants.  For example, the low wages earned by recent 
immigrants from Mexico and Central America, many of whom are undocumented, are primarily 
due to their low levels of education and English proficiency, not their illegal status (Duncan, 
Hotz, and Trejo 2006).  Unskilled immigrants, whether legal or illegal, tend to be treated 
similarly by the U.S. labor market. 
 
III.  The Second and Third Generations 
  Historically, much of the socioeconomic mobility achieved by U.S. immigrant families 
has taken place across rather than within generations.  For example, previous waves of 
predominantly unskilled immigrants, such as the Italians and Irish, enjoyed substantial 
intergenerational progress that ultimately enabled their descendants to join the economic   20
mainstream of American society, but this process took at least two or three generations to unfold 
(Chiswick 1977; Neidert and Farley 1985; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Farley 1990; Borjas 
1994b; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Alba and Nee 2003; Perlmann 2005).  There is 
considerable skepticism, however, that the processes of assimilation and adaptation will operate 
similarly for the predominantly non-white immigrants who have entered the United States in 
increasing numbers over the past several decades (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 
1994).  Indeed, Huntington (2004) voices a particularly strong version of such skepticism with 
regard to Hispanic immigration.  When assessing the long-term economic integration and impact 
of immigrants, it is therefore important to analyze differences not just between the foreign-born 
and U.S-born, but also, when possible, across generations of the U.S.-born (Borjas 1993; Card 
2005; Smith 2006).  In this section, we explore what available data can tell us about such 
intergenerational patterns. 
 
A.  Outcomes by Immigrant Generation 
  Beginning in 1980, the decennial Census stopped asking respondents about the countries 
of birth of their parents, and the ACS follows the Census in this regard.  Starting in 1994, 
however, the Current Population Survey (CPS) began collecting this information on a regular 
basis from all respondents.  As a result, the CPS is currently the best large-scale U.S. data set for 
investigating how outcomes vary by immigrant generation.  For the analyses in this section, we 
employ CPS microdata for all months from January 2003 through December 2009.
11  The time 
                                                 
11 The CPS is a monthly survey of about 60,000 households that the U.S. government administers to estimate 
unemployment rates and other indicators of labor market activity.  In addition to the detailed demographic and labor force data 
reported for all respondents, the CPS collects earnings  information each month from one-quarter of the sample, the so-called 
“outgoing rotation groups.”  The data we analyze come from these outgoing rotation group samples.  The CPS sampling scheme 
is such that surveys for the same month in adjacent years have about half of their respondents in common (e.g., about half of the 
respondents in any January survey are re-interviewed the following January).  To obtain independent samples, we use only data   21
frame of our CPS sample is therefore centered on the years of ACS data (2005-2007) analyzed 
earlier.  As we did with the ACS data, we restrict our CPS sample to men ages 25-59 who do not 
reside in institutions. 
  Using the CPS information on the countries of birth of each individual and his parents, 
we define the following nativity/generation groups.  Foreign-born individuals are assigned to the 
same three categories employed with the ACS data:  those born abroad of an American parent, 
“child immigrants” who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and “adult 
immigrants” who arrived at age 16 or later.
12  U.S.-born individuals, however, are now 
distinguished by the nativity of their parents.  Standard practice is for the “second generation” to 
include all U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent, but members of this 
group with one U.S.-born and one foreign-born parent have unique experiences and often display 
different socioeconomic outcomes than their peers with two foreign-born parents (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001; Ramakrishnan 2004; Rumbaut 2004).  Therefore, we assign U.S.-born 
individuals to three groups:  those with two foreign-born parents (sometimes referred to as the 
“2.0 generation”), those with parents of “mixed nativity” (i.e., one parent is foreign-born and the 
other is U.S.-born; this group is sometimes labeled the “2.5 generation”), and those with two 
U.S.-born parents (sometimes called the “third and higher generation” or “native born of native 
parentage”).  Compared to the ACS data analyzed earlier, the main advantage of the CPS is this 
ability to distinguish between the second and higher generations of U.S.-born men.  One 
drawback of the CPS, however, is the absence of information about English proficiency. 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the first time a household appears in the outgoing rotation group samples (i.e., we use only data from the fourth month that 
a household appears in the CPS sample).  By pooling together these seven years of monthly CPS data, we substantially increase 
sample sizes and improve the precision of our estimates. 
12 In the context of immigrant generations, child immigrants are sometimes referred to as the “1.5 generation” 
(Rumbaut 2004).   22
  Table 9 reports the distribution of our CPS sample by nativity/generation and 
race/ethnicity and shows sample sizes and average completed years of schooling for the relevant 
groups.  Foreign-born individuals make up just under 20 percent of the sample, and another six 
percent are second-generation (i.e., U.S.-born individuals with a foreign-born parent), with half 
of the second generation having two foreign-born parents and the other half with parents of 
mixed nativity.  As we saw with the ACS data, average educational attainment is relatively low 
for immigrants—whether they arrived as adults (11.9 years) or as children (12.4 years)—
compared to U.S.-born individuals.  By the second generation, however, this schooling gap is 
erased, as both types of second-generation men exhibit education levels at least as high as the 
average schooling (13.6 years) of third- and higher-generation men. 
  Among second-generation men, Hispanics stand out as the only racial/ethnic group with 
educational attainment significantly below that of third-generation whites.  Schooling levels are 
also relatively low for third-generation Hispanics and blacks.  As a result, Hispanics assume a 
central role in current discussions of immigrant intergenerational progress and the outlook for 
the so-called “new second generation,” not just because Hispanics make up a large share of the 
U.S. immigrant population, but also because most indications of relative socioeconomic 
disadvantage among the children of U.S. immigrants vanish when Hispanics are excluded from 
the sample (Perlmann and Waldinger 1996, 1997).  Therefore, to a great extent, concern about 
the long-term economic trajectory of immigrant families in the United States is concern about 
Hispanic-American families.
13
  In order to investigate how labor market outcomes vary with immigrant generation, Table 
10 presents employment and wage regressions from the CPS data.  Here, the dependent variable 
                                                 
13 See Smith (2006), however, for a more optimistic take on the intergenerational schooling gains made by Hispanics.   23
for the employment regressions is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed during 
the CPS survey week.  The dependent variable for the wage regressions is the natural logarithm 
of average hourly earnings.  Unlike the ACS data analyzed earlier, however, the CPS outgoing 
rotation group data report only earnings from wage and salary jobs (i.e., self-employment 
income is excluded).  Since the focus now is on comparing second-generation men with higher-
generation men, and these groups have similar levels of education, we no longer run separate 
regressions for high school dropouts versus others.  Otherwise, these regressions are similar to 
those reported previously for the ACS data, with controls for age and geographic location, as 
well as for the survey month and year of each CPS observation. 
  Overall, Table 10 reveals only minor differences in the labor market outcomes of U.S.-
born men according to the nativity of their parents.  In the column (1) regressions, which do not 
control for education, U.S.-born men with two foreign-born parents (i.e., 2.0 generation men) 
exhibit slight deficits in employment (0.9 percentage points) and wages (1.2 percent) relative to 
third- and higher-generation men, whereas the analogous comparisons actually show small 
advantages (1.4 percentage points for employment and 3.7 percent for wages) for U.S.-born men 
with mixed nativity parents (i.e., the 2.5 generation).  After controlling for education, these 
differences become even smaller (see the column (2) regressions), especially the labor market 
advantages for 2.5-generation men. 
  Table 11 shows how these labor market differences by nativity/generation vary across 
racial/ethnic groups.  The reported differentials are all relative to the reference group consisting 
of non-Hispanic white men who are U.S.-born with U.S.-born parents.  Among U.S.-born men, 
blacks stand out with employment and wage deficits that remain large even after conditioning on 
education.  Compared to third- and higher-generation whites with similar education, for   24
example, the column (2) estimates imply that the employment rates of U.S.-born blacks are about 
12 percent lower for men with zero or one foreign-born parents and 19 percent lower for men 
with two foreign-born parents.  The corresponding wage gaps are around 20 percent for all three 
groups of U.S.-born black men.  Second- and third-generation Hispanic men also exhibit modest 
employment and substantial wage deficits relative to third-generation whites, but these deficits 
shrink by half or more after controlling for education.  Conditional on observables, the remaining 
gaps are much smaller for U.S.-born Hispanics (1-2 percentage points for employment and about 
9 percent for wages) than they are for U.S.-born blacks, which suggests that labor market 
opportunities may be more similar to those of whites for Hispanics than for blacks (Trejo 1997; 
Grogger and Trejo 2002; Duncan, Hotz, and Trejo 2006). 
  In contrast with blacks and Hispanics, labor market deficits are either small or 
nonexistent for first- and second-generation white and Asian men.  Second-generation Asian 
men do have somewhat lower employment rates than third-generation whites, however, and 
wage comparisons for all generations of Asian men become less favorable after controlling for 
education.  As others have noted (Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009), the schooling advantage 
of Asian Americans can obscure the fact that they tend to earn somewhat less than Anglos with 
the same level of education. 
 
B.  Intermarriage and Selective Ethnic Attrition 
  In this chapter, we have followed the common practice of using self-reported 
race/ethnicity to approximate the national origins of first- and second-generation immigrants 
(e.g., a second-generation Hispanic is someone born in the United States who identifies as 
Hispanic and has a foreign-born parent).  An alternative (and perhaps more precise) approach is   25
to assign national origins based on the birthplaces of the individual and his parents (e.g., a 
second-generation Hispanic is someone born in the United States to a parent born in a Spanish-
speaking country).  For foreign-born individuals, the two approaches to assigning national 
origins yield very similar samples and results (Rumbaut 2004; Perez and Hirschman 2009).  For 
second-generation individuals, a modest amount of ethnic attrition becomes discernable (e.g., 
U.S.-born individuals who do not self-identify as Hispanic despite being the children of 
immigrants from a Spanish-speaking country), but the overall impact on measured characteristics 
of the population remains small (Rumbaut 2004; Duncan and Trejo 2011a).  It is in the third and 
later generations where intermarriage and assimilation complicate ethnic identification to an 
extent that might distort our inferences about the socioeconomic attainment of the descendents of 
immigrants.  Although this issue is difficult to study with available data, it is increasingly 
recognized as an important consideration when assessing the long-term integration of some 
immigrant groups (Bean et al. 2005; Alba and Islam 2009; Duncan and Trejo 2011b, 2011c). 
  Frequent intermarriage is one of the strongest signals of social assimilation by an ethnic 
group with immigrant origins (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003).  In addition, intermarriage is a 
key determinant of weakened and/or multiple ethnic attachments for future generations of the 
group (Hout and Goldstein 1994, Perlmann and Waters 2007).  After a few generations in the 
United States, so much intermarriage had taken place among the descendants of earlier European 
immigrants that most white Americans could choose among multiple ancestries or ethnic 
identities (Alba 1990; Waters 1990).  For such individuals, ethnicity has become subjective, 
situational, and largely symbolic, and the social boundaries between these ethnic groups have 
been almost completely erased. 
  Recently, we have begun to study to linkages between intermarriage, generational   26
complexity, and ethnic identification for the specific case of Mexican Americans (Duncan and 
Trejo 2007, 2009a, 2011a, 2011c).  We find that selective ethnic attrition creates potentially 
serious problems for tracking the socioeconomic progress of the U.S.-born descendants of 
Mexican immigrants.  Almost without exception, studies of later-generation Mexican Americans 
rely on subjective measures of ethnic self-identification to identify the population of interest.  As 
the descendants of Mexican immigrants assimilate into American society and often intermarry 
with non-Mexicans, ethnic identification weakens, particularly among the children produced by 
Mexican intermarriages.  Unfolding across generations, this dynamic suggests that an 
increasingly small fraction of the descendants of Mexican immigrants continue to identify 
themselves as Mexican.  Moreover, this process of ethnic leakage is highly selective, because 
Mexican Americans who intermarry tend to have much higher education and earnings than 
Mexican Americans who do not intermarry.  Consequently, available data for third- and higher-
generation Mexicans, who usually can only be identified by their subjective responses to 
questions about Hispanic ethnicity, understate the socioeconomic attainment of this population. 
  We uncover several different kinds of empirical evidence that are consistent with this 
story.  Data from the 1970 Census Content Reinterview Study suggest that self-identified 
samples of U.S. Hispanics omit a large proportion of later-generation individuals with Hispanic 
ancestors, and that intermarriage is a fundamental source of such intergenerational ethnic 
attrition (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1974, page 8, Table C).  Data from the 2000 Census indicate 
that intermarriage is widespread among Mexican Americans.  More than a third of married, U.S.-
born Mexicans have non-Mexican spouses, with the overwhelming majority of these non-
Mexican spouses being U.S.-born, non-Hispanic whites.  Because it takes two Mexican-origin 
spouses to create an endogamous Mexican marriage, whereas a Mexican intermarriage requires   27
only one Mexican-origin spouse, the observed rate of intermarriage implies that almost half of 
Mexican-American marriages involve a non-Mexican spouse.  In addition, Mexican 
intermarriage is highly selective on human capital and labor market success, and having a non-
Mexican parent largely determines whether children of Mexican descent are at risk of losing 
their Mexican identity (Duncan and Trejo 2007).  Taken together, these findings provide a 
mechanism for selective ethnic attrition among Mexican Americans.  Those Mexicans who 
intermarry tend to have higher levels of education and earnings, and many of the resulting 
children are not identified as Mexican in Census data.  In this way, selective intermarriage 
interacts with the intergenerational transmission of human capital and ethnic identity to create a 
situation in which available data for later-generation Mexican Americans may omit an 
increasingly large share of the most successful descendants of Mexican immigrants. 
  Two pieces of indirect evidence corroborate the direction of the measurement bias 
generated by this process of selective ethnic attrition.  First, in 1980 Census data for five 
southwestern states where the Hispanic population was overwhelmingly Mexican origin at that 
time, men with a Spanish surname who nonetheless self-identify as “not Hispanic” are much 
more educated and English proficient, on average, than their counterparts who are consistently 
identified as Hispanic by both surname and self-report (Duncan and Trejo 2007).  Second, in 
2000 Census data, human capital advantages are also evident for men who list a Mexican 
ancestry but simultaneously report their ethnicity as “not Hispanic,” relative to men who report 
Mexican as both their ancestry and their ethnicity (Duncan and Trejo 2009a).  In each case, the 
segment of the Mexican-American population that seems to have weaker or more distant ethnic 
ties displays significantly higher levels of socioeconomic attainment. 
  Finally, using data on U.S.-born Mexican-American children from recent years of the   28
CPS, we provide some direct evidence of selective ethnic attrition (Duncan and Trejo 2011a).  
For children living with both parents, the CPS data reveal how many parents and grandparents 
were born in Mexico.  We assess the influence of endogenous ethnicity by comparing an 
“objective” indicator of Mexican descent (based on the countries of birth of the child, his 
parents, and his grandparents) with the standard “subjective” measure of Mexican self-
identification (based on the response to the Hispanic origin question).  Immigrant generations 
turn out to be quite complex, and this complexity is closely related to children’s subjective 
Mexican identification.  For example, only 17 percent of third-generation Mexicans have a 
majority of their grandparents born in Mexico.  Moreover, third-generation children are virtually 
certain of identifying as Mexican if three or more grandparents were born in Mexico, whereas 
rates of Mexican identification fall to 79 percent for children with two grandparents born in 
Mexico and 58 percent for children with just one Mexican-born grandparent.  Overall, about 30 
percent of third-generation Mexican children fail to self-identify as Mexican in our CPS sample, 
and this ethnic attrition is highly selective.  For example, the high school dropout rate of third-
generation Mexican youth is 25 percent higher when the sample is limited to those youth who 
self-identify as Mexican.  Therefore, these CPS data provide some direct evidence that ethnic 
attrition is substantial and could produce significant downward bias in standard measures of 
attainment which rely on ethnic self-identification rather than objective indicators of Mexican 
descent. 
  For other groups, previous research illustrates how selective ethnic identification can 
distort observed socioeconomic characteristics.  American Indians are a particularly apt example, 
because they exhibit very high rates of intermarriage, and fewer than half of the children of such 
intermarriages are identified as American Indian by the Census race question (Eschbach 1995).    29
For these and other reasons, racial identification is relatively fluid for American Indians, and 
changes in self-identification account for much of the surprisingly large increase in educational 
attainment observed for American Indians between the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses (Eschbach, 
Supple, and Snipp 1998).  In addition, Snipp (1989) shows that those who report American 
Indian as their race have considerably lower schooling and earnings, on average, than the much 
larger group of Americans who report a non-Indian race but claim to have some Indian ancestry. 
  To cite another example, Waters (1994, 1999) observes selective ethnic identification 
among the U.S.-born children of New York City immigrants from the West Indies and Haiti.  
The teenagers doing well in school tend to come from relatively advantaged, middle-class 
families, and these kids identify most closely with the ethnic origins of their parents.  In contrast, 
the teenagers doing poorly in school are more likely to identify with African Americans.  This 
pattern suggests that self-identified samples of second-generation Caribbean blacks might 
overstate the socioeconomic achievement of this population, a finding that potentially calls into 
question the practice of comparing outcomes for African Americans and Caribbean blacks as a 
means of distinguishing racial discrimination from other explanations for the disadvantaged 
status of African Americans (Sowell 1978). 
  As noted earlier, existing empirical research raises concerns that some Hispanic groups, 
including Mexicans, are experiencing markedly less intergenerational progress than other 
immigrant groups (Perlmann and Waldinger, 1996, 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Huntington 
2004; Perlmann 2005).  Do our results mitigate such concerns?  We show that available data are 
likely to understate the socioeconomic achievement of later-generation Mexican Americans, but 
what does this imply about their standing relative to other immigrant groups?  Given that 
intermarriage is the primary source of this bias, we might expect similar or larger biases for other   30
immigrant groups, because most other groups exhibit intermarriage rates at least as high as those 
of Mexicans (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Lichter and Qian 2005).  If the direction of the bias is 
the same for all groups, then appropriate corrections could produce no improvement or even 
deterioration in the relative position of Mexican Americans. 
  We have begun to investigate selective ethnic attrition for national origin groups besides 
Mexicans, and our preliminary findings suggest that correcting for the resulting biases will in 
fact raise the attainment of later-generation Hispanic Americans relative to the descendants of 
most other U.S. immigrant groups (Duncan and Trejo 2011b).  Like Mexicans, Puerto Ricans are 
an Hispanic group that shows signs of intergenerational stagnation, and the extent and selectivity 
of ethnic attrition seems roughly similar for U.S.-born Puerto Ricans as for Mexican Americans.  
The selectivity of ethnic attrition is reversed, however, for Asian-American groups with 
comparatively high levels of education, such as U.S.-born Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and 
Indians.  Among the descendants of immigrants from these Asian countries, those with fewer 
years of schooling are less likely to retain an Asian identification, which suggests that ethnic 
attrition inflates standard measures of socioeconomic attainment for later-generation Asian 
Americans.  Furtado (2006) advances a model of interethnic marriage that potentially explains 
why the selectivity of ethnic attrition works in the opposite direction for low-education Hispanic 
groups versus high-education Asian groups.
14  Therefore, Furtado’s theoretical insights and our 
own preliminary empirical work both provide reasons to suspect that ethnic attrition generates 
                                                 
14 Furtado’s model emphasizes how the supplies of potential spouses vary with ethnic-specific schooling distributions 
in marriage markets where individuals hope to match on both education and ethnicity.  A college-educated Mexican American, 
for example, may choose to intermarry because of the relative scarcity of other Mexican ethnics with a college degree.  Asian 
Americans tend to be overrepresented on college campuses, however, so for these groups it may instead be the less-educated 
individuals that face a more difficult time finding co-ethnics to marry within their education group.  Consequently, this model 
predicts that members of high-education groups who intermarry should be negatively selected in terms of education, whereas the 
selectivity should be positive for intermarried members of low-education groups.  Because intermarriage is a fundamental source 
of ethnic attrition, the differences across groups in intermarriage selectivity predicted by Furtado’s model can generate 
corresponding differences in the selectivity of ethnic attrition.   31
measurement biases that vary across national origin groups in direction as well as magnitude, 
and that correcting for these biases will raise the relative socioeconomic standing of the U.S.-
born descendants of Hispanic immigrants. 
 
IV.  Impact on Native Workers 
  In recent years, many studies have attempted to estimate the impact of immigration on 
the wages and employment opportunities of U.S.-born workers.  Useful surveys of the academic 
literature on this topic include Borjas (1994a, 1999), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Smith and 
Edmonston (1997, Chapters 4-5), Card (2005, 2009), and Raphael and Ronconi (2007).  
Lowenstein (2006) provides a non-technical discussion of the key issues that is both readable 
and nuanced. 
  For the most part, the empirical methodology used to estimate the impact of immigration 
on native workers has been to compare labor market outcomes (e.g., wages, employment rates, 
or unemployment rates) for natives in U.S. metropolitan areas that did and did not receive large 
inflows of immigrants.  For example, over the past few decades, cities such as Los Angeles and 
Houston have received many new immigrants, especially unskilled immigrants, whereas other 
cities like Cleveland and Pittsburgh received few immigrants.  Over this period, how have 
earnings and employment opportunities changed for native workers who might be thought to 
compete for jobs with unskilled immigrants, such as native workers who did not finish high 
school?  If labor market competition with immigrants harmed unskilled native workers, then we 
would expect the wages and employment rates of unskilled natives in high-immigration cities 
like Los Angeles and Houston to have deteriorated relative to their counterparts in low-
immigration cities such as Cleveland and Pittsburgh.   32
  This type of analysis suggests that, on average, immigration has only very modest effects 
on the labor market opportunities of native workers, even of unskilled natives.  Statistical 
correlations are weak across U.S. metropolitan areas between measures of immigrant penetration 
and native labor market outcomes.  This remains true even after controlling for observable 
differences across cities (in, for example, demographics or industrial composition), and even 
when comparing intertemporal changes in immigrant inflows and native outcomes (in order to 
control for unobservable differences between cities that persist over time).  After reviewing the 
available evidence, a National Academy of Sciences panel assembled to evaluate the impacts of 
U.S. immigration concluded that the “weight of the empirical evidence suggests that the impact 
of immigration on the wages of competing native-born workers is small—possibly reducing 
them by only 1 or 2 percent” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 220).  Similarly, Friedberg and 
Hunt (1995, p. 42) conclude their survey of the academic literature on the topic with the 
statement:  “Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the wages 
and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature on this question does 
not provide much support for this conclusion.” 
  An important potential problem with the empirical methodology used in much of the 
literature is that immigrants may be choosing to locate in U.S. metropolitan areas with the most 
dynamic local economies.  If sunbelt cities like Los Angeles and Houston are booming, then 
even with a large influx of immigrants, wage and employment growth for native workers in these 
cities may match or exceed the corresponding growth for native workers in less prosperous cities 
like Cleveland and Pittsburgh.  What we really want to know, however, is whether labor market 
outcomes for natives in Los Angeles and Houston would have been even more favorable in the 
absence of the immigrant influx.  Convincingly answering this kind of counterfactual question is   33
typically difficult to do in nonexperimental settings.  It would be easier to answer this question if 
we could study a large, exogenous, and unexpected inflow of immigrants to a particular city. 
  In an influential paper, Card (1990) studied an immigrant inflow that plausibly satisfies 
these conditions.  In April 1980, Fidel Castro unexpectedly announced that Cubans wishing to 
emigrate to the United States were free to leave from the port of Mariel.  From May to 
September 1980, some 125,000 Cuban immigrants arrived in Miami on boats and rafts.  Half of 
these so-called Mariel immigrants settled permanently in Miami, increasing the city’s labor force 
by 7 percent and its Cuban work force by 20 percent.  This influx of Mariel immigrants thus 
produced a large and unexpected increase in the supply of unskilled labor in Miami.  Card 
estimates the impacts of this surge of unskilled immigrants by tracking labor market outcomes 
for native workers in Miami during the years before and after the Mariel boatlift.  In order to 
control for overall labor market trends, Card also compares the experiences of native workers in 
Miami with the experiences of native workers in four other metropolitan areas chosen for being 
similar to Miami demographically and economically:  Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and 
Tampa-St. Petersburg.  Card’s analysis finds no evidence that the Mariel immigrants adversely 
affected the wages, employment rates, or unemployment rates of native workers in Miami. 
  The textbook model of supply and demand predicts that, when a large influx of 
immigrants shifts out the supply of labor in a market, the equilibrium wage should fall as a 
consequence of movement along the downward-sloping demand for labor curve.  It was 
therefore surprising to economists that spatial correlations (across U.S. metropolitan areas) 
between immigrant inflows and native worker outcomes suggest that immigrants do not 
significantly affect the wages or employment opportunities of natives.  What could account for 
this result?  One possibility is that the location decisions of native workers help to mitigate the   34
local labor market effects of immigration.  In response to any decline in labor market 
opportunities caused by a large immigration influx into a particular city, natives might leave that 
city or alter plans they had to move into that city.  Indeed, Card (1990, p. 257) finds some 
evidence that “the net migration rate of natives and earlier immigrants into the Miami area 
slowed considerably after the Boatlift.  To some extent the Mariels may have displaced other 
migrants from within the United States who could have been expected to move to Miami.”  
There is disagreement, however, over the ultimate importance of this factor.  Looking at data for 
a large number of cities in the late 1980s, Card (2001, p. 47) concludes that “mobility flows of 
natives and older immigrants are not very sensitive to inflows of new immigrants.”  On the other 
hand, using a somewhat different methodology applied to data for the 1960-2000 period, Borjas 
(2006) finds a bigger impact of immigration on native internal migration. 
  Capital is also potentially mobile, given enough time, so if immigration were to lower the 
wages of unskilled workers in particular cities, businesses that intensively employ unskilled 
labor may move to or expand in these cities in order to take advantage of the low wages.  
Contrary to this explanation, Lewis (2003) and Card and Lewis (2007) show that when 
metropolitan areas receive an influx of unskilled immigrants, only a small portion of the influx is 
absorbed through an expansion of industries that intensively employ unskilled workers.  Instead, 
most of the adjustment takes place within industries; in other words, cities that receive large 
inflows of unskilled immigrants tend to use unskilled labor more intensively—in all industries—
than do cities that receive fewer unskilled immigrants.  Lewis (2011) provides evidence that, in 
metropolitan areas where unskilled workers are plentiful due to immigration, industries are less 
likely to adopt advanced technologies such as automation that can substitute for unskilled labor. 
  Because of the possibility that equilibrating reallocations of labor and capital within the   35
United States might make it difficult to detect the effects of immigration by comparing cities or 
regions, Borjas (2003) argues that it is best to analyze U.S. immigration at the national level.  
Instead of using the geographic clustering of immigrants to identify their impact, Borjas exploits 
the fact that new immigrant arrivals are concentrated in particular age groups and education 
levels, and that the extent and nature of this concentration has changed over time.  Workers are 
sorted into cells defined according to age (as a proxy for work experience) and education, with 
each cell meant to represent workers with similar labor market “skills.”  Because education 
remains fixed for most workers after they enter the work force full-time as adults, Borjas argues 
that native workers are unlikely to move across these skill categories in response to immigration.  
He therefore estimates the effects of immigration by examining how the earnings and 
employment of natives in a particular skill group respond to immigration-induced changes in the 
supply of labor in that same skill group.  Contrary to most of the previous literature, Borjas’s 
approach produces estimates which imply that immigrants significantly depress the labor market 
opportunities of competing native workers.  Using his estimates to simulate the impact of the 
large and relatively unskilled influx of immigrants that the United States received between 1980-
2000, Borjas concludes that the adverse effects of immigrants on wages fell most heavily on 
younger native workers who failed to complete high school—in other words, the least skilled 
native workers. 
  As noted by Ottaviano and Peri (2011), however, the ultimate magnitude of 
immigration’s impact on native wages implied by an analysis of this type hinges on two key 
issues.
15  The first issue is how quickly the stock of productive capital (e.g., equipment, 
machinery, plant size, etc.) adjusts to the influx of immigrants.  Borjas’s simulations focus on the   36
“short run” situation in which the capital stock does not adjust at all to immigration.  Standard 
economic theory predicts that in the “long run”—i.e., after the capital stock fully adjusts to an 
influx of immigrants—the average wage returns to the same level it was before these immigrants 
arrived.  The wages paid to particular skill groups of workers can rise or fall because of 
immigration, even in the long run, but the overall average wage is not affected once capital has 
adjusted.  Therefore the time it takes the capital stock to respond to an influx of immigrants is 
important for determining immigration’s aggregate impact, because immigration can have a 
nonzero net effect on the overall wage only during the transition period when capital is adjusting.  
The second issue is whether, in their roles as inputs in the production process, immigrant and 
native workers in the same age/education group are perfect substitutes for each other.  To the 
extent that immigrant and native workers, even those with otherwise similar observable 
characteristics, have somewhat different skills and are therefore imperfect substitutes as inputs, 
then any adverse labor market impacts of immigration might fall mainly on the immigrants 
themselves (both new and previous arrivals) rather than on natives. 
  Ottaviano and Peri (2011) provide evidence that immigrant and native workers are indeed 
imperfect substitutes within age/education groups.  Incorporating both imperfect substitution and 
the gradual adjustment of capital into their simulations, Ottaviano and Peri (2011) produce 
estimates of immigration’s impact on native workers that are much more favorable than those 
produced by Borjas (2003).  According to Ottaviano and Peri, the only group of native workers 
harmed by immigration is U.S.-born high school dropouts, and the wage losses suffered by this 
group are small.  Instead, immigration generates large wage reductions for foreign-born workers 
of all education levels. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Peri (2006a, 2006b, 2007) provides non-technical discussions of these particular issues and the general topic of   37
  Because no consensus has been reached, it is not straightforward to summarize the 
findings of academic research on the impact of immigration on native workers.  One important 
conclusion, however, is that both immigrants and natives should be distinguished by their labor 
market skills.  As noted by Borjas (1995b) and Card (2001), immigration will alter the wage 
structure—i.e., the relative earnings of different skill groups—only to the extent that the skill 
composition of immigrants differs from the skill composition of natives.  Therefore, when 
estimating the impact of immigration, it is imperative that the overall influx of immigrants be 
disaggregated into labor inflows of various skill levels, and it is also imperative that these 
immigrant inflows be allowed to differentially affect native of workers of different skill levels.  
A distinguishing feature of U.S. immigration over the past few decades is that, compared to 
natives, immigrants are disproportionately concentrated in the lowest education groups.  Using 
broad occupation categories to approximate skill groups, Card (2001) exploits cross-city 
variation in the size and skill content of U.S. immigration inflows between 1985-90, and he finds 
evidence that immigration did reduce the wages and employment rates of competing native 
workers (particularly low-skilled natives living in high-immigration cities), although the 
estimated effects are relatively modest.  Using age and education to approximate skill groups, 
Borjas (2003) exploits national-level variation in the timing and skill content of U.S. 
immigration over the period 1960-2000, and he produces impacts of immigration that are 
roughly 2-3 times as large as those estimated by Card (2001).  As noted above, however, 
Ottaviano and Peri (2011) show that changing Borjas’s implicit assumptions about the speed of 
capital adjustment and the substitutability of immigrant and native labor within skill groups can 
result in immigration ultimately being less harmful for low-skilled native workers and more 
                                                                                                                                                             
immigration’s impact on native workers.   38
beneficial for other native workers. 
  Earlier assessments (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Smith and Edmonston 1997) that 
immigration’s impact on native workers is minimal, even for low-skilled natives, are probably 
unduly optimistic, because this conclusion is based on studies that for the most part did not 
adequately account for the skill composition of immigrant flows and the differential effects of 
these flows on natives in disparate skill groups.  Subsequent studies (Card 2001, Borjas 2003) 
that are careful to make these distinctions tend to find more negative impacts of immigration on 
low-skilled native workers, but, in our opinion, the estimated effects can still be characterized as 
being fairly modest.  Card (2009) argues that workers who did not finish high school are perfect 
substitutes for those with a high school diploma, and that this fact accounts for the surprisingly 
modest impacts of immigration on low-skilled natives.  If the relevant skill group includes all 
those with 12 years of schooling or less, then immigrants no longer differ so dramatically from 
natives in the fraction of low-skilled workers, and the impact of low-skilled immigration is no 
longer focused so narrowly on the segment of the native labor force consisting only of high 
school dropouts. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  At first blush, there are several reasons to expect problems with the economic integration 
of American immigrants.  Unlike other important host countries such as Australia and Canada, 
the United States makes little or no effort to regulate either the volume or the skill content of 
immigration flows to fit with current labor market needs.  Moreover, a large share of U.S. 
immigration is illegal, and the government appears to have limited control over this 
predominately unskilled flow.  Finally, inequality and the returns to skill in the U.S. labor market   39
have been rising over the last few decades as large numbers of unskilled immigrants have 
entered the country.  Both in terms of design and implementation, U.S. immigration policy 
seems haphazard. 
  Despite all of these warning signs, the labor market performance of U.S. immigrants is 
surprisingly good.  Immigrants have little trouble finding jobs, and this is particularly true of 
unskilled immigrants.  Most immigrants experience substantial earnings growth as they adapt to 
the American labor market, and the wages they earn are commensurate with their skills.  Overall, 
the U.S.-born second generation has achieved economic parity with mainstream society; for 
some Hispanic groups, however, this is not the case.  On the whole, immigration to the United 
States has not had large adverse consequences for the labor market opportunities of native 
workers.  Therefore, with regard to the economic integration and labor market impacts of 
immigration, it is not obvious that the seemingly haphazard nature of U.S. immigration policy 
has led to unfavorable outcomes. 
  These findings also suggest that immigration is not a major determinant of U.S. poverty.  
The relatively modest estimated impacts of immigration on native wages and employment imply 
that the corresponding effect on the poverty rate of natives is likely to be small, and simulations 
of this effect by Raphael and Smolensky (2009a) are consistent with such an expectation.  High 
immigrant employment rates and the wage growth associated with assimilation, along with the 
fact that immigrants remain a small share of the U.S. population, serve to limit the compositional 
effect of rising immigration on changes in the overall poverty rate.  Estimates of this 
compositional effect indicate that U.S. immigration has played at most a minor role in poverty 
rate movements over the past several decades (Chapman and Bernstein 2003; Raphael and 
Smolensky 2009b).   40
  Despite the explosion in recent years of economic research on the integration and impact 
of international migrants, many topics are ripe for further investigation.  Regarding the labor 
market assimilation of immigrants, much could be learned from additional studies like Lubotsky 
(2007) that exploit longitudinal data.  Moreover, we need to better understand the relative 
importance of particular human capital investments and other factors that drive the post-arrival 
earnings growth of immigrants, such as additional schooling (Betts and Lofstrom 2000), 
becoming proficient in the host country language (Bleakley and Chin 2004), acquiring 
citizenship (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002; Mazzolari 2009), and legalization of formerly 
undocumented immigrants (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002).  With respect to the descendants 
of immigrants, important and understudied topics include the following:  how growing up with 
an undocumented parent affects the U.S.-born children of immigrants (Bean et al. 2011), why 
intergenerational convergence seems to be slower for some Hispanic groups (Perlman and 
Waldinger 1996, 1997; Smith 2003; Telles and Ortiz 2008), and the extent to which selective 
ethnic attrition distorts inferences regarding the socioeconomic attainment and relative standing 
of later-generation members of various immigrant groups (Duncan and Trejo 2011b). 
  In recent years, Hispanic immigrants have increasingly settled in new regions of the 
United States where formerly they had little or no presence (Fischer and Tienda 2006; Card and 
Lewis 2007).  This so-called “Hispanic Diaspora” creates unique issues for receiving 
communities and schools that often had little previous experience with immigrants (Fry 2011), 
and it will be important to monitor the integration of Hispanic immigrants in these new 
destinations.  Moreover, some of these new destinations have sizeable African-American 
populations (e.g., Atlanta, Georgia, and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina), which makes it 
interesting to study whether the labor market impacts of immigration on native workers are   41
different in these cities (Card and Lewis 2007).  A related and controversial issue is the potential 
role that low-skill immigration plays in the declining employment and rising incarceration rates 
of African-American men.  Research to date on this question reaches conflicting conclusions 
(Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 2011; Raphael and Ronconi 2005), so further work would be 
useful.  Within the general topic of immigration’s impact on natives, other questions ripe for 
further study include how low-skilled immigration affects particular prices (Cortes 2008) and 
how certain groups of natives respond to such price changes (Furtado and Hock 2010; Cortes 
and Tessada 2011).  Given the important academic and policy issues raised by the large numbers 
of immigrants received by the United States over the past several decades and the likely 
continuation of these flows in the foreseeable future, research on U.S. immigration shows no 
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Table 1:  Percentage Distributions and Average Education of U.S. Men, Ages 25-59,  
by Nativity and Race/Ethnicity 
 
   Percent   
of Total 
 Sample   
Size 
 Average   
Education 
A. By Nativity         
U.S.-born   80.6   1,674,940   13.5 
Foreign-born:         
   Born abroad of American parent    0.9    17,379    13.9 
   Child immigrant    3.8    65,046    12.6 
   Adult immigrant    14.7    236,327    11.8 
All nativity groups    100.0%    1,993,692    13.2 
         
B. By Nativity and Race/Ethnicity         
U.S.-born         
   Hispanic    6.3    85,483    12.6 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    79.5    1,402,011    13.7 
      Black    11.3    140,066    12.7 
      Asian    1.0    15,265    14.8 
      Other race    1.9    32,115    13.0 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    1,674,940    13.5 
Born abroad of American parent         
   Hispanic    14.4    2,043    12.5 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    67.2    12,567    14.2 
      Black    5.8    767    13.7 
      Asian    7.4    1,106    14.1 
      Other race    5.2    896    14.0 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    17,379    13.9 
Child immigrant         
   Hispanic    53.5    32,242    11.2 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    19.2    14,829    14.0 
      Black    5.5    3,041    13.8 
      Asian    20.3    13,937    14.6 
      Other race    1.4    997    13.3 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    65,046    12.6 
Adult immigrant         
   Hispanic    52.9    113,278    9.7 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    16.1    44,112    14.3 
      Black    7.3    16,114    13.3 
      Asian    22.4    59,532    14.5 
      Other race    1.4    3,291    12.9 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    236,327    11.8 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions.  Among foreign-born individuals who 
were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age 
of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the 
calculations.  
Table 2:  Educational Distributions (%) of U.S. Men, Ages 25-59,  
by Nativity and Race/Ethnicity 
 
    Years of Education:    All Educ. 
   <12    12   13-15   16+  Levels 
A. By Nativity               
U.S.-born   7.8   33.0   29.7   29.4   100.0% 
Foreign-born:                    
   Born abroad of American parent    6.4    23.7    32.3    37.6    100.0% 
      Child  immigrant   19.8   29.6   24.7   25.9   100.0% 
      Adult  immigrant   30.3   26.7   15.1   27.9   100.0% 
                    
B. By Nativity and Race/Ethnicity               
U.S.-born               
      Hispanic   15.7   37.2   30.8   16.3   100.0% 
   Non-Hispanic:                     
      White    6.6    31.6    29.6    32.3    100.0% 
      Black    12.4    42.0    29.9    15.8    100.0% 
      Asian    3.0    16.4    26.3    54.2    100.0% 
      Other race    11.4    35.1    33.7    19.8    100.0% 
Born abroad of American parent               
      Hispanic   19.3   29.8   26.1   24.8   100.0% 
   Non-Hispanic:                     
      White    4.0    22.5    32.8    40.7    100.0% 
      Black    4.8    29.8    36.6    28.8    100.0% 
      Asian    5.8    20.0    32.8    41.3    100.0% 
      Other race    3.7    20.9    38.1    37.3    100.0% 
Child immigrant               
      Hispanic   32.6   35.2   20.6   11.6   100.0% 
   Non-Hispanic:                     
      White    6.4    26.3    28.8    38.5    100.0% 
      Black    4.1    28.9    37.3    29.7    100.0% 
      Asian    3.8    18.2    27.7    50.3    100.0% 
      Other race    10.4    28.3    31.6    29.7    100.0% 
Adult immigrant               
      Hispanic   49.3   30.1   11.6    9.1   100.0% 
   Non-Hispanic:                     
      White    7.1    24.4    20.1    48.4    100.0% 
      Black    10.7    32.6    26.1    30.5    100.0% 
      Asian    9.1    18.4    15.9    56.6    100.0% 
      Other race    18.5    29.7    18.9    33.0    100.0% 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures show the percentage of individuals from each nativity group and race/ethnicity who fall 
within a particular educational category.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions (see 
Table 1 for sample sizes).  Among foreign-born individuals who were not born to an American parent, “child 
immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who 
arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 3:  Employment Rates (%) of U.S. Men, Ages 25-59,  
by Nativity and Education Level 
 
    Years of Education:    All Educ. 
   <12    12   13-15   16+  Levels 
                    
U.S.-born   71.9   87.7   91.9   95.8   90.1% 
   (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Foreign-born:                    
   Born abroad of American parent    82.1    90.7    92.9    96.0    92.8 
   (1.26)  (0.47)  (0.34)  (0.24)  (0.20) 
                    
   Child immigrant    88.7    91.0    92.9    95.3    92.1 
   (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.11) 
                    
   Adult immigrant    92.4    92.9    92.3    93.8    92.9 
   (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.05) 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures give the percentage of individuals who were employed at any time during the twelve 
months preceding the survey date.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 
who do not reside in institutions (see Table 1 for sample sizes).  Among foreign-born individuals who were not born 
to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and 
“adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 4:  Employment Regressions 
 
    Years of Education: 
    Less than 12    12 or More 
Regressor   (1)   (2)   (1)  (2) 
             
U.S.-born (reference group)                 
             
Foreign-born:             
   Born abroad of American parent    .084    .084    .004    .004 
   (.015)  (.015)  (.002)  (.002) 
   Child immigrant    .133    .133    .003    .002 
   (.004)  (.004)  (.001)  (.001) 
   Adult immigrant    .186        .008     
   (.002)      (.0008)     
      0-2 years in U.S.        .153        -.084 
       (.005)      (.004) 
      3-5 years in U.S.        .188        -.009 
       (.004)      (.002) 
      6-10 years in U.S.        .178        .014 
       (.003)      (.001) 
      11-15 years in U.S.        .181        .021 
       (.004)      (.002) 
      16-20 years in U.S.        .193        .026 
       (.004)      (.002) 
      Over 20 years in U.S.        .203        .027 
       (.004)      (.002) 
Education:             
   12 years (reference group)                 
             
   13-15 years            .037    .037 
           (.0007)   (.0007) 
   16 or more years            .074    .074 
           (.0006)   (.0006) 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions, run separately by education 
category, in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed at any time 
during the twelve months preceding the survey date.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions (see Table 1 for sample sizes).  
All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey year.  Among foreign-born individuals 
who were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the 
age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the 
calculations.  
Table 5:  Employment Differentials (Relative to U.S.-born, Non-Hispanic Whites),  
by Nativity, Race/Ethnicity, and Education Level 
 
    Years of Education: 
Regressor    Less than 12    12 or More 
        
U.S.-born       
   Hispanic    .012    -.017 
   (.005)   (.001) 
   Non-Hispanic:         
      White (reference group)         
        
      Black    -.152    -.076 
   (.005)   (.001) 
      Asian    -.035    -.027 
   (.027)   (.003) 
      Other race    -.100    -.065 
   (.010)   (.003) 
Adult immigrant       
   Hispanic    .166    .020 
   (.003)   (.001) 
   Non-Hispanic:         
      White    .124    -.005 
   (.009)   (.002) 
      Black    .126    -.011 
   (.011)   (.003) 
      Asian    .106    -.030 
   (.007)   (.002) 
      Other race    .160    -.007 
   (.013)   (.006) 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions, run separately by education 
category, in which the dependent variable is a dummy identifying individuals who were employed at any time 
during the twelve months preceding the survey date.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions (see Table 1 for sample sizes).  
All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey year, and the regression for those with 12 
or more years of education also includes dummies identifying individuals with 13-15 and 16 or more years of 
education.  Among foreign-born individuals who were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those 
who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or 
later.  Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 6:  English Proficiency Distributions (%) of U.S. Men, Ages 25-59,  
by Nativity and Education Level 
 
          
   Speaks  English:    
    
Only 
  Very Well  
or Well 
  Not Well  
or Not at All 
  All Levels of 
Proficiency 
A. By Nativity              
U.S.-born   93.4    6.3    0.4    100.0% 
Foreign-born:                
   Born abroad of American parent    76.0    21.2    2.8    100.0% 
   Child immigrant    24.0    64.9    11.1    100.0% 
   Adult immigrant    11.1    53.6    35.3    100.0% 
                
B. By Nativity and Education Level            
U.S.-born            
   Less than 12 years of education    88.2    10.3    1.5    100.0% 
   12 or more years of education    93.8    5.9    0.3    100.0% 
Born abroad of American parent            
   Less than 12 years of education    44.4    35.9    19.8    100.0% 
   12 or more years of education    78.2    20.2    1.7    100.0% 
Child immigrant            
   Less than 12 years of education    6.6    57.9    35.5    100.0% 
   12 or more years of education    28.3    66.6    5.1    100.0% 
Adult immigrant            
   Less than 12 years of education    4.2    30.6    65.3    100.0% 
   12 or more years of education    14.1    63.6    22.3    100.0% 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures show the percentage of individuals from each nativity group and education level who 
fall within a particular category for self-reported proficiency at speaking English.  The sample includes men ages 
25-59 who do not reside in institutions (see Table 1 for sample sizes).  Among foreign-born individuals who were 
not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, 
and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 7:  Wage Regressions 
 
    Years of Education: 
    Less than 12    12 or More 
Regressor   (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
                    
U.S.-born  (reference  group)                    
                    
Foreign-born:                    
   Born abroad of American parent    -.012    -.011    .042    -.031    -.031    -.013 
    (.028)   (.028)   (.028)   (.007)   (.007)   (.007) 
      Child  immigrant   -.068   -.071   .023   -.029   -.030   .038 
    (.008)   (.008)   (.011)   (.004)   (.004)   (.004) 
   Adult immigrant    -.186            -.208         
    (.005)          (.002)        
      0-2 years in U.S.        -.343    -.120        -.326    -.125 
       (.012)   (.014)       (.008)   (.009) 
      3-5 years in U.S.        -.288    -.091        -.316    -.128 
       (.010)   (.012)       (.006)   (.007) 
      6-10 years in U.S.        -.216    -.047        -.213    -.048 
       (.007)   (.010)       (.004)   (.005) 
      11-15 years in U.S.        -.179    -.031        -.183    -.032 
       (.008)   (.011)       (.005)   (.006) 
      16-20 years in U.S.        -.136    -.0003        -.188    -.047 
       (.009)   (.011)       (.005)   (.006) 
      Over 20 years in U.S.        -.080    .040        -.131    -.012 
       (.007)   (.010)       (.004)   (.005) 
Speaks  English:                    
   Only (reference group)                         
                    
   Very well            -.032            -.054 
          (.009)          (.003) 
   Well            -.068            -.219 
          (.010)          (.004) 
   Not well            -.194            -.354 
          (.009)          (.005) 
   Not at all            -.303            -.433 
          (.011)          (.010) 
Education:                    
   12 years (reference group)                         
                    
   13-15 years                .169    .168    .158 
               (.002)   (.002)   (.002) 
   16 or more years                .591    .592    .573 
               (.002)   (.002)   (.002) 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions, run separately by education 
category, in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of average hourly earnings during the twelve 
months preceding the survey date.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The sample 
includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions and who report average hourly earnings between $1 and 
$1,000.  The sample sizes are 155,667 for those with less than 12 years of education and 1,647,100 for those with  
12 or more years of education.  All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey year.  
Among foreign-born individuals who were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who 
arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  
Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 8:  Wage Differentials (Relative to U.S.-born, Non-Hispanic Whites),  
by Nativity, Race/Ethnicity, and Education Level 
 
    Years of Education: 
    Less than 12    12 or More 
Regressor   (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
                
U.S.-born               
   Hispanic    -.135    -.128    -.105    -.077 
    (.009)   (.011)   (.003)   (.004) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White (reference group)                 
                
      Black    -.186    -.187    -.200    -.202 
    (.010)   (.010)   (.003)   (.003) 
      Asian    .0005    .002    -.032    -.016 
    (.054)   (.054)   (.007)   (.007) 
      Other race    -.107    -.110    -.151    -.146 
    (.018)   (.018)   (.006)   (.006) 
Adult immigrant               
   Hispanic    -.254    -.121    -.368    -.167 
    (.005)   (.011)   (.003)   (.005) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White    .012    .080    -.058    .030 
    (.018)   (.019)   (.005)   (.005) 
      Black    -.193    -.145    -.316    -.258 
    (.021)   (.021)   (.007)   (.007) 
      Asian    -.282    -.168    -.177    -.056 
    (.013)   (.016)   (.004)   (.005) 
      Other race    -.119    -.021    -.221    -.128 
    (.040)   (.040)   (.016)   (.016) 
                
Controls for English proficiency?    No    Yes    No    Yes 
 
Source:  2005-2007 American Community Survey data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions, run separately by education 
category, in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of average hourly earnings during the twelve 
months preceding the survey date.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The sample 
includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions and who report average hourly earnings between $1 and 
$1,000.  The sample sizes are 155,667 for those with less than 12 years of education and 1,647,100 for those with 
12 or more years of education.  All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey year, and 
the regressions for those with 12 or more years of education also include dummies identifying individuals with 13-
15 and 16 or more years of education.  Among foreign-born individuals who were not born to an American parent, 
“child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those 
who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the calculations.  
Table 9:  Percentage Distributions and Average Education of U.S. Men, Ages 25-59,  
by Nativity/Generation and Race/Ethnicity 
 
   Percent   
of Total 
 Sample   
Size 
 Average   
Education 
A. By Nativity/Generation         
U.S.-born:         
   U.S.-born parents    74.8    263,030    13.6 
   Mixed nativity parents    3.0    10,216    14.0 
   Foreign-born parents    3.0    8,104    13.7 
Foreign-born:         
   Born abroad of American parent    1.0    3,199    13.9 
   Child immigrant    4.2    10,903    12.4 
   Adult immigrant    14.1    38,355    11.9 
All nativity/generation groups    100.0%    333,807    13.3 
         
B. By Nativity/Generation and 
        Race/Ethnicity 
       
U.S.-born with U.S.-born parents         
   Hispanic    4.0    8,144    12.7 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    81.6    222,715    13.7 
      Black    12.1    23,425    12.9 
      Asian    0.5    2,079    14.4 
      Other race    1.8    6,667    12.9 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    263,030    13.6 
U.S.-born with mixed nativity parents         
   Hispanic    24.2    1,859    13.1 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    65.9    7,291    14.4 
      Black    3.2    240    13.6 
      Asian    3.5    406    14.3 
      Other race    3.3    420    13.8 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    10,216    14.0 
U.S.-born with foreign-born parents         
   Hispanic    49.7    3,545    12.8 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    30.9    2,987    14.5 
      Black    4.0    257    14.1 
      Asian    14.9    1,252    15.1 
      Other race    0.5    63    14.3 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    8,104    13.7 
Adult immigrant         
   Hispanic    53.2    19,329    9.7 
   Non-Hispanic:             
      White    17.1    7,516    14.3 
      Black    7.6    2,751    13.3 
      Asian    21.9    8,601    14.7 
      Other race    0.3    158    14.2 
   All race/ethnic groups    100.0%    38,355    11.9 
  
Source:  2003-2009 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data. 
Note:  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who do not reside in institutions.  Among foreign-born individuals who 
were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United States before the age 
of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were used in the 
calculations.  
Table 10:  Employment and Wage Regressions 
 
   Employment    Log  Wage 
Regressor   (1)   (2)   (1)  (2) 
             
U.S.-born:             
   U.S.-born parents (reference group)                 
             
   Mixed nativity parents    .014    .008    .037    .010 
   (.004)  (.004)  (.008)  (.007) 
   Foreign-born parents    -.009    -.007    -.012    -.009 
   (.005)  (.005)  (.008)  (.007) 
Foreign-born:             
   Born abroad of American parent    .014    .008    .010    -.017 
   (.007)  (.007)  (.013)  (.012) 
   Child immigrant    .006    .034    -.155    -.061 
   (.004)  (.004)  (.007)  (.006) 
   Adult immigrant                 
      0-10 years in U.S.    .012    .045    -.294    -.196 
   (.003)  (.003)  (.006)  (.006) 
      Over 10 years in U.S.    .030    .069    -.273    -.146 
   (.003)  (.003)  (.006)  (.005) 
Education:             
   Less than 12 years        -.108        -.236 
       (.003)      (.004) 
   12 years (reference group)                 
             
   13-15 years        .041        .122 
       (.002)      (.003) 
   16 or more years        .098        .492 
       (.002)      (.003) 
 
Source:  2003-2009 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions.  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The dependent variable for the employment regressions is a dummy 
identifying individuals who were employed during the CPS survey week.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who 
do not reside in institutions (see Table 9 for sample sizes). The dependent variable for the wage regressions is the 
natural logarithm of average hourly earnings.  The sample for these regressions is further restricted to employed 
individuals who report average hourly earnings between $1 and $1,000.  The sample size for the wage regressions is 
239,796.  All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year.  Among foreign-
born individuals who were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United 
States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were 
used in the calculations.  
Table 11:  Employment and Wage Differentials (Relative to U.S.-born, Non-Hispanic 
Whites with U.S.-Born Parents), by Nativity/Generation and Race/Ethnicity 
 
   Employment    Log  Wage 
Regressor   (1)   (2)   (1)  (2) 
             
U.S.-born with U.S.-born parents             
      Hispanic   -.054   -.026   -.187   -.088 
   (.005)  (.005)  (.008)  (.007) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White (reference group)                 
             
      Black    -.149    -.127    -.304    -.229 
   (.003)  (.003)  (.005)  (.005) 
      Asian    .007    -.003    -.032    -.074 
   (.010)  (.010)  (.019)  (.017) 
U.S.-born with mixed nativity parents             
      Hispanic   -.031   -.012   -.156   -.091 
   (.009)  (.009)  (.017)  (.015) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White    .010    -.002    .058    .015 
   (.005)  (.005)  (.009)  (.008) 
      Black    -.116    -.112    -.181    -.170 
   (.031)  (.030)  (.050)  (.047) 
      Asian    -.027    -.035    -.006    -.042 
   (.023)  (.022)  (.040)  (.036) 
U.S.-born with foreign-born parents             
      Hispanic   -.041   -.013   -.187   -.084 
   (.007)  (.007)  (.011)  (.010) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White    -.003    -.015    .088    .032 
   (.007)  (.007)  (.014)  (.013) 
      Black    -.186    -.193    -.141    -.189 
   (.032)  (.031)  (.047)  (.044) 
      Asian    -.023    -.045    .102    -.011 
   (.012)  (.011)  (.022)  (.020) 
Adult immigrant in U.S. over 10 years             
      Hispanic   -.003   .087   -.516   -.258 
   (.004)  (.004)  (.006)  (.006) 
   Non-Hispanic:                 
      White    .022    .019    .017    -.016 
   (.006)  (.006)  (.013)  (.011) 
      Black    -.005    .009    -.298    -.248 
   (.010)  (.010)  (.019)  (.017) 
      Asian    .024    .020    -.060    -.113 
   (.005)  (.005)  (.013)  (.011) 
             
Controls for education?    No    Yes    No    Yes 
 
Source:  2003-2009 Current Population Survey outgoing rotation group data. 
Note:  The reported figures are estimated coefficients from least squares regressions.  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The dependent variable for the employment regressions is a dummy  
identifying individuals who were employed during the CPS survey week.  The sample includes men ages 25-59 who 
do not reside in institutions (see Table 9 for sample sizes). The dependent variable for the wage regressions is the 
natural logarithm of average hourly earnings.  The sample for these regressions is further restricted to employed 
individuals who report average hourly earnings between $1 and $1,000.  The sample size for the wage regressions is 
239,796.  All regressions include controls for age, geographic location, and survey month/year.  Among foreign-
born individuals who were not born to an American parent, “child immigrants” are those who arrived in the United 
States before the age of 16, and “adult immigrants” are those who arrived at age 16 or later.  Sampling weights were 
used in the calculations. 